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A SUGGESTION CONCEINING THE LAW OF INTER-STATE
EXTRADITION.
PRoFESsoR EDWIN F. CONELY.
While yet the nation was forming-indeed as early as 1643-the
impolicy of the colonies' suffering themselves to become asylums for
criminal refugees was seen and appreciated by the public men of the time.
But, though continued efforts were made in the right direction and much
was accomplished, the rendition of fugitives from justice remained, either
legally or practically, a matter of comity for nearly a century and a
half, or until the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.
Then, made mandatory by the organic law of the Nation, inter-state ex-
tradition ceased to be subject to State control or dependent upon State
consent.
The Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2, provides that a person charged in
any State with treason, felony, or any other crime, who shall flee from
justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed
to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.
This provision is not self-executing. It does not prescribe:
1. The authority upon whom the demand shall be made.
2. The form of the demand.
3. The method of procedure.
The difficulty of enforcing it without the aid of appropriate legislation
was discovered in 1791, through a demand made by Governor Mifflin of
Pennsylvania, upon Governor Randolph of Virginia, for the rendition of
an alleged fugitive criminal. Surrender having been refused, Governor
Mifflin brought the matter to the attention of President Washington, who
immediately submitted the subject of inter-state extradition to Congress
for consideration and action. The result was the Act of 1793, now in force
as sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes.
These statutes provide that "whenever the executive authority of any
State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the
executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has
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fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made
before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person
demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified
as authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory
from which the person so charged has fled, to cause him to be arrested and
secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive
anthority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed
to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such
agent when he shall appear." ,
The validity of this sort of legislation was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet., 539; Ken-
tucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S., 80.
It may be considered as settled by the decisions of that tribunal:
1. That inter-state extradition is a constitional principle.
2. That the practical application of it may be enforced by national
authority; and,
3. That, in legislating upon it, Congress may prescribe:
(a.) The authority upon whom the demand shall be made.
(b.) The form of the demand.
(c.) The method of procedure.
The Act of 1793 covers points (a), (b) and (c), but if any part of the
statute is invalid or unwise, it is that which requires that the demand
shall be made upon the executive authority of the State into which the
fugitive hasfled:
1. Because the Governor of a State as such cannot be compelled to
act as the ministerial officer of the United States.
2. Because, as the Governor may decline to act, with or without
reason, the mandatory policy of the constitution is defeated.
Mr. Justice Story, in Prigg v. Commonwealth, expressed doubt con-
cerning the constitutionality of that part of the Act of 1793 which con-
ferred authority upon State officers, but in Kentucky v. Dennison, the
Supreme Court held that the Governor of a State could act if he wished to
do so, but could not be coerced.
This decision is sound, though it left the statute without positive force
except as a rule of procedure.
Through the voluntary action of the Governors of the several States,
and the efforts of fugitive criminals to avoid rendition, the National and
State courts have had occasion to further construe the law of interstate
extradition and the following may be considered as determined:
1. That the constitutional provision relative to the demand and sur-
render of fugitives from justice includes every offense made punishable by
the law of the State in which it was committed.*
* Kentucky-v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S.642.
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2. That the right to demand arrest and surrender implies the corre-
lative duty to apprehend and deliver withoat reference to the policy or
laws of the State to which the fugitive has fled.*
3. That, to be a fugitive from justice, in the extraditiona] sense, it is
not necessary that the party charged should have fled to avoid prosecution
anticipated or begun; but, simply, that having within a State committed
that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be sub-
jected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its
jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.t
4. That, in extradition proceedings, the guilt or innocence of the
fugitive is not in question.
5. That objections to the forms of pleadings and process must be
referred to the courts of the demanding State.1
6. That the constitutional requirement, that full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other State, applies to extradition proceedings.
7. That the Governor of a State in proceeding in a case of extradition,
acts under National, not State authority.
From the foregoing it results that the Governor of the asylum State,
in considering an application for the rendition of an alleged fugitive
criminal, has but three questions before -him, viz:
1. Does the showing made by the demanding State, in form and
authentication, conform to the requirements of the laws of the United
States?
2. Does it appear, from such showing, that the alleged fugitive is
charged with having committed a crime within the demanding State?
3. Is the person charged, a fugitive from the justice of the demanding
State, in the extraditional sense?
The first and second are questions of law, and are to be determined by
the inspection of the requisition and accompanying papers.
The third is a question of fact, the affirmative of which may be estab-
lished by oral testimony or by affidavit. For practical reasons, the latter
course is usually followed, though the Constitution and the Statutes are
silent as to the method of proof. The Governor may hear the person
charged on the question, whether he is a fugitive, etc., but this is a matter
of discretion.
With what has been stated kept well in mind, the duty of the Governor
of the asylum State, in a case of interstate extradition, is simple, clear,
and of easy performance.
But, unfortunately, through ignorance of the law, or through failure
to comprehend or appreciate its broad, national policy, or, through a spirit
of particularism, Governors of asylum States have not infrequently enter-
* Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
t Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80.
S Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642.
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tained the opinion that, in extradition cases, they act as representatives of
the State, rather than of the Nation, and have exercised powers not
conferred by the Constitution and laws of the Uhited States.
In thus acting without the scope of National authority, Governors of
asylum States have assumed to consider and determine:
1. Whether the person charged, etc., had committed an offense it
the demanding State?
2; Whether the requisition of the demanding State was made i
good faith?
That a Governor upon whom a demand is made, rarely, if ever,
directly and openly proceeds to try the question of guilt or innocence, is
quite true; but that he, often, indirectly assumes the function of the trial
court by investigating and determining whether the acts charged con-
stitute an offense under the laws of the demanding State, or, whether such
acts show a completed offense in that or some other State, is equally true.
This is usually done under the guise of solving the question, whether
the person charged was within the demanding State when-as it is put-
the crime was committed, instead of-as it should be put-the acts which
are alleged to constitute the crime, were committed.
It is also true,-and that it is, is to be regretted-that Governors of
asylum States, with indubitable evidence before them of the rectitude of
the extradition proceeding, nevertheless presume to question its good faith.
A recent instance will serve as an illustration.
The agent of the demanding State presented to the Governor of the
asylum State a requisition for the arrest and surrender of the fugitive,
together with the indictment of the grand jury of the county in which the
offense was perpetrated, duly charging the accused with having committed
a crime against the laws of the demanding State; the affidavit of the com-
plaining witness, a reputable citizen, showing that at the time the acts
alleged to constitute the crime were committed the accused was bodily-
not constructively-at the place of their commission and within the terri-
torial limits of the demanding State, that he had left that State and had
taken refuge in the State upon whose Governor the requisition was made,
and that the proceedings against him were instituted and prosecuted in
good faith- and for no private end; and the affidavit of the official prose-
cutor of the demanding State-a lawyer of more than local reputation and
a gentleman whose personal and official integrity would be put beyond
question by the mere mention of his name-and the deposition of his
assistant-less known, but an able and honorable member of the profes-
sion-showing that not only had the indictment been found and the requi-
sition made without design or expectation of furthering selfish ends, but
also that their use for any purpose other than the vindication of the public
justice of the demanding State would not be tolerated.
All this was approved and authenticated, according to law, by the
demanding Governor, under the Great Seal of his State, and, after careful
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examination, pronounced legally unassailable by the Attorney General of
the asylum State.
In the face of this, of the constitutional mandate that full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every
other State, and of the admission of the fugitive that he was in the
demanding State when the acts charged against him were committed, the
Governor upon whom the demand was made, on the interested testimony
of the fugitive and his friends, held:
1. That the accused was not guilty of violating the laws of the
demanding State; and,
2. That the requisition was made in bad faith!
As there is no appeal from such a determination, would it not be well
to relieve the impotency of the present law of inter-state extradition by
conferring upon the National Courts exclusive authority to cause the arrest
and surrender?
